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I. INTRODUCTION 
As criminal adjudications have become more central to determining an 
alien’s removability from the United States or his eligibility for discretionary 
relief from removal, criminal law principles—including application of the 
categorical approach, recourse to the exclusionary rule, and the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine—have all gained prominence in immigration law.1 The 
                                                                                                                     
  Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United 
States Department of Justice. 
 † J.D., Harvard Law School (2016); B.A., Bates College. Ms. Stillman was an intern 
in the Office of Immigration Litigation from May 2014 through August 2014. The views 
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 1 See, e.g., Patrick J. Glen, The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and Immigration 
Proceedings, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 749, 749–51 (2013) (noting the various confluences of 
criminal law and immigration law). 
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“rule of lenity” can now be safely added to this mix since the immigration bar 
has become increasingly aggressive in arguing for application of the rule to 
immigration cases, particularly before the Supreme Court.2 The Supreme 
Court has noted the rule in several immigration cases, but always in passing, 
never as a central tenet of the holding, and invariably in the context of Board 
of Immigration Appeals’ (Board) interpretations of provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that expressly incorporate federal 
criminal statutes.3 It has never been applied to foreclose the Board’s 
interpretation of a civil provision of the INA based only on the fact that the 
civil determination may entail criminal consequences in a future prosecution.4 
There is good reason to believe that application of the rule to the Board’s 
interpretation in this latter circumstance would be inappropriate, given that it is 
well-established that the principles of Chevron deference apply to the Board’s 
reasonable interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the INA.5 In a recent 
dissent presenting the issue, however, Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took the opposite view—that 
where the INA’s civil provisions have the possibility of entailing criminal 
consequences, the rule of lenity should displace Chevron deference and 
mandate that any ambiguity in the civil statute be construed in the alien’s 
favor.6 This view, although consistent with that advanced by the private 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 38–47, Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) 
(No. 14-1096), 2015 WL 4967191, at *38–47 (arguing that the rule should apply to 
displace application of Chevron deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
construction of subsection (E)(i) of the INA’s aggravated felony provision, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)). 
 3 See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010) (invoking the 
rule of lenity where the relevant immigration provision cross-referenced the Controlled 
Substances Act, a federal criminal statute); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) 
(same, regarding INA’s incorporation of the definition of a “crime of violence” contained 
in a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16). 
 4 Cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1175–76 (2012) (“Finally, the 
Kawashimas argue that subparagraph [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)](M)’s treatment of tax 
crimes other than tax evasion is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe the 
statute in their favor. It is true that we have, in the past, construed ambiguities in 
deportation statutes in the alien’s favor. We think the application of the present statute clear 
enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted.” (citation omitted)). 
 5 See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (plurality 
opinion) (“Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets the immigration 
laws.” (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984))); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 
(1999) (“It is clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to [the INA] 
statutory scheme.”); see also Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2012) 
(explaining that the Board’s interpretation of the INA “prevails if it is a reasonable 
construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the 
one a court might think best”). 
 6 See Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027–32 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, No.16-54, 2016 WL 3689050 
(Oct. 28, 2016) (mem.). 
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immigration bar, seems mistaken for several reasons: first, it relies on an 
outdated notion of lenity that is inconsistent with the rule’s current application; 
second, it minimizes the fairly clear, if implicit, tack of relevant Supreme 
Court precedent; third, it misunderstands how deference canons, and Chevron 
in particular, may interact with principles of lenity; and fourth, it creates a 
problem in need of a solution—lenity for criminal aliens charged or sentenced 
based on arguably innocent conduct—that does not seem to exist as a practical 
matter. 
This Case Comment addresses how deference and lenity should apply in 
the immigration context, using the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Esquivel-
Quintana v. Lynch as an illustrative example of competing views.7 We argue 
that principles of Chevron deference should not be displaced by the rule of 
lenity when a court is confronted with a so-called “dual-use” statute—a civil 
provision that may also entail criminal liability—and that both canons can 
easily coexist given the Supreme Court’s consistent holdings regarding when 
and how the rule of lenity applies. Part II presents the court of appeals’ 
decision in Esquivel-Quintana, with specific focus on Judge Sutton’s dissent 
from the panel majority’s application of Chevron deference. Part III turns to 
the crux of the issue, the application of the rule of lenity, including the narrow 
scope of the rule’s potential application in immigration proceedings, how the 
rule has been interpreted as a general matter, and how the Supreme Court has 
applied deference in cases that would seemingly otherwise call for an 
application of lenity. Finally, Part IV addresses practical considerations 
against allowing lenity to displace deference in this context, including the 
disproportionate (or illusory) gains and the fact that concerns over criminal 
consequences can be better addressed in the criminal proceeding itself. 
II. HOW TO CONSTRUE AMBIGUITY IN THE PHRASE “SEXUAL ABUSE OF A 
MINOR”: ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA V. LYNCH 
The issue presented to the Sixth Circuit in Esquivel-Quintana was whether 
a lawful permanent resident was nonetheless removable from the United States 
as an alien who was convicted of an aggravated felony offense.8 The charge of 
removability related to Esquivel-Quintana’s 2009 conviction for “unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a minor” under a California state law, providing, in 
relevant part, that “[a]ny person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the 
perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony.”9 According to the 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. at 1020–21; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (“Any alien who 
is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). 
 9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(c) (West 2014). 
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Department of Homeland Security, this conviction constituted an aggravated 
felony offense, defined under the INA to include “sexual abuse of a minor.”10 
In a precedential decision, the Board agreed that a conviction under this 
section of the California Penal Code categorically constitutes an aggravated 
felony offense, sexual abuse of a minor.11 The Board interpreted 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) to require, vis-à-vis statutory rape offenses, “a meaningful 
age difference between the victim and the perpetrator,” before the offense 
could categorically qualify as “sexual abuse of a minor.”12 The Board based its 
interpretation on a need to balance effectuating Congressional intent to remove 
those who sexually abuse minors with the need to not punish consensual 
sexual conduct between older peers.13 As California’s statute did contain a 
meaningful age differential—at least three years—the Board concluded that 
Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction categorically constituted a removable 
offense.14 
On review before the court of appeals, a panel of the Sixth Circuit denied 
the petition, concluding that Chevron deference was appropriate given the 
precedential nature of the Board’s decision and that its construction of the 
phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” was a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous 
statutory language.15 In reaching this conclusion, the panel majority rejected 
Esquivel-Quintana’s contention that the rule of lenity demanded that any 
ambiguities in the statute should be resolved in the alien’s favor.16 It 
                                                                                                                     
 10 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1020–21. “Aggravated felony” is a term of art 
under the INA, and an offense can constitute an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43) 
even if it is punishable only as a misdemeanor. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); United 
States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 902–03 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘Aggravated felony’ is 
a term of art created by Congress to describe a class of offenses that subjects aliens 
convicted of those offenses to certain disabilities. ‘Aggravated felonies’ are not necessarily 
a subset of felonies; for instance, an offense classified by state law as a misdemeanor can 
be an ‘aggravated felony’ triggering a sentencing enhancement under § 2L1.2 if the offense 
otherwise conforms to the federal definition of ‘aggravated felony’ found in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43). In determining whether state convictions are aggravated felonies, courts 
have consistently favored substance over form, looking beyond the labels attached to the 
offenses by state law and considering whether the offenses substantively meet the statutory 
definition of ‘aggravated felony.’” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Gonzales-
Vela, 276 F.3d 763, 765–68 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that misdemeanor sexual abuse of a 
minor may constitute an “aggravated felony” offense under § 1101(a)(43)(A)). 
 11 In re Esquivel-Quintana, 26 I. & N. Dec. 469, 477 (B.I.A. 2015), petition for review 
denied sub nom. Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
No.16-54, 2016 WL 3689050 (Oct. 28, 2016) (mem.). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., id. at 476 (“In evaluating whether an offense is categorically one of 
‘sexual abuse,’ we must carry out the congressional intent to impose immigration 
consequences on those who have been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor without 
including nonabusive consensual sexual intercourse between older adolescent peers.”). 
 14 Id. at 477. 
 15 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1024–26. 
 16 Id. at 1023–24. 
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determined that to the extent the Supreme Court has addressed that question, it 
applied deference to the exclusion of lenity when reviewing relevant agency 
action.17 Moreover, interpretation of the INA was not otherwise an 
“extraordinary” case that would mandate ignoring the applicability of Chevron 
deference.18 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton dissented from this holding and would have applied 
the rule of lenity to resolve the statutory ambiguity, not Chevron deference.19 
He concurred with the conclusion that the relevant statutory phrase, “sexual 
abuse of a minor,” is ambiguous.20 But because the determination of whether 
an alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony under the INA has civil 
and potential criminal consequences, Judge Sutton would have applied the rule 
of lenity resulting in a conclusion that Esquivel-Quintana was not 
removable.21 Judge Sutton based this application on the Supreme Court’s prior 
directive that a statute must have the same interpretation in both civil and 
criminal contexts, thus concluding that deference should not be given to the 
Board’s interpretation of a term where a court in a criminal proceeding would 
have to resolve the ambiguity against the harsher, but possibly reasonable, 
interpretation of the statute.22 He also disagreed with the panel majority’s 
reliance on Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon, as the Supreme Court’s observation in that case on the non-
applicability of the rule of lenity was made only in passing and no other 
Supreme Court decision has explicitly opined that Chevron retains its full 
force when confronting agency interpretations of dual-use statutes.23 Finally, 
Judge Sutton believed that a categorical exception to Chevron deference for 
dual-use statutes fit comfortably with other areas where the Supreme Court 
had crafted exceptions to the application of deference.24 
III. DEFERENCE VERSUS LENITY, OR DEFERENCE THEN LENITY? 
Although Judge Sutton’s approach to the issue has some intuitive appeal, 
the panel majority’s decision is the preferable legal harmonization of 
principles of deference and lenity, as well as the better interpretation of 
existing Supreme Court precedent. To understand why this is the case, and 
why deference precedes lenity in interpreting dual-use statutes, it is important 
to apprehend three points: (1) what exactly is at issue in interpreting dual-use 
                                                                                                                     
 17 Id. at 1024 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 687, 703–04 (1995)). 
 18 Id. at 1024 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015)). 
 19 Id. at 1029–30 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 20 Id. at 1027–28. 
 21 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1030–31 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 22 Id. at 1031 (citing, inter alia, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)). 
 23 Id. at 1030–31. 
 24 Id. at 1031–32 (collecting cases). 
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statutes in immigration cases; (2) how the Supreme Court generally applies the 
rule of lenity; and (3) how the Supreme Court has thus far applied deference 
canons in cases that might otherwise call for application of the rule of lenity. 
Exploring these points, the subject of the instant part, leads one away from 
Judge Sutton’s conclusion that lenity, to the exclusion of deference, is the 
correct rule for immigration cases. 
A. Disentangling What Is at Issue 
It is important to understand how and why there is a potential conflict 
between deference principles and the rule of lenity when interpreting a dual-
use immigration statute. Cases such as Esquivel-Quintana’s are not about 
interpretation of federal or state criminal statutes, where the rule of lenity is 
most directly applicable, as the agency receives no deference in interpreting 
such provisions.25 These cases are also not about interpreting a civil provision 
that explicitly incorporates a federal criminal statute or standard, as no 
deference is warranted in that case either, at least to the extent interpretation of 
the criminal statute is relevant.26 Rather, what is at issue is the Board’s 
interpretation of a purely civil provision contained wholly within the INA and 
relevant only to immigration law. 
It is well-established that the Board is entitled to receive deference for its 
reasonable interpretation of ambiguous provisions in the INA.27 However, the 
argument from lenity contends that deference is not warranted for the Board’s 
interpretation of the civil INA in civil removal proceedings, to the extent that it 
is interpreting provisions that might form the basis for subsequent criminal 
sanctions in a different proceeding. 
The criminal consequences related to interpretation of the civil provisions 
of the INA are confined to three statutory sections within Title 8 of the United 
States Code. First, § 1253 entails certain penalties when an alien, “being a 
member of any of the classes described in [§] 1227(a) of” the INA, which 
relates to those aliens who are deportable, and either fail to depart or otherwise 
attempt to defeat removal after removability has been finally established.28 As 
a general matter, an alien convicted of a violation of this section will receive a 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See, e.g., Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Although we 
generally defer to the BIA’s interpretations of the INA, where, as here, the BIA construes 
statutes [and state law] over which it has no particular expertise, its interpretations are not 
entitled to deference.” (alteration in original) (quoting Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 566 
(4th Cir. 2013))); Ramos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(“We owe no Chevron deference to the Board’s interpretation of the Georgia [criminal] 
statute, which the Board has no power to administer.”); Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 
208 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the issue turns on the meaning of a federal statute other than the 
INA, we possess the requisite expertise to interpret a federal criminal statute such that no 
deference is due.”). 
 26 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 27 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 28 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
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prison sentence of “not more than four years.”29 But a higher sentence of not 
more than ten years may be assessed “if the alien is a member of any of the 
classes described in paragraph[s]” § 1227(a)(1)(E) (alien smuggling), 
§ 1227(a)(2) (criminal offenses), § 1227(a)(3) (document fraud), or 
§ 1227(a)(4) (security, terrorism, and related grounds).30 
Second, § 1326 pertains to the illegal reentry or attempted illegal reentry 
of an alien who has previously been “denied admission, excluded, deported, or 
removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, 
deportation, or removal is outstanding.”31 The general statutory sentence for a 
violation of this provision is “not more than 2 years.”32 Nonetheless, the 
statute also provides two relevant enhancements. If an alien’s removal “was 
subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony” under 
§ 1101(a)(43), the statutory maximum is twenty years,33 while if an alien has 
previously been excluded on expedited grounds because of inadmissibility 
under § 1182(a)(3)(B), relating to terrorist activities, the statutory maximum is 
ten years.34 Finally, § 1327 relates to “[a]iding or assisting certain aliens to 
enter.”35 It provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly aids or assists any alien 
inadmissible under [§] 1182(a)(2) (insofar as an alien inadmissible under such 
section has been convicted of an aggravated felony) or [§] 1182(a)(3) . . . of 
this title to enter the United States . . . shall be fined under [T]itle 18, or 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”36 
Because the Board’s determination of removability or inadmissibility 
under the sections referenced in these three criminal provisions—including 
aggravated felony determinations under § 1101(a)(43) and potentially all 
removability determinations under § 1227(a)—could impose criminal liability 
or increase an alien’s sentence in a hypothetical criminal prosecution, the 
lenity argument contends that any ambiguities in these civil provisions should 
be resolved in favor of the alien. 
B. The Last-Resort Role of Lenity 
The rule of lenity is “[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in 
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent 
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient 
punishment.”37 Whatever the historical reach of the rule,38 the modern 
                                                                                                                     
 29 See id. § 1253(a)(1). 
 30 Id.; see also id. § 1227(a)(1)–(4). 
 31 Id. § 1326(a)(1). 
 32 Id. § 1326(a). 
 33 Id. § 1326(b)(2). 
 34 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(3). 
 35 Id. § 1327. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1532 (10th ed. 2014); see also DAVID 
MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 577 (1992) 
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conception of lenity is not mechanistic in its application. Answering the 
question of whether lenity applies is not simply considering whether the 
statute is not clear or whether the statute may permit a narrower construction, 
thus effectively mandating adoption of the narrower or mitigating 
interpretation.39 Rather, “the rule of lenity only applies if, after considering 
text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in the statute, such that the Court must simply guess as to what 
Congress intended.”40 
Thus, the courts must bring traditional interpretive tools to bear on an 
ambiguous statutory phrase in order to ascertain its meaning and can proceed 
to a “lenient” construction only when these tools are incapable of resolving the 
ambiguity.41 Accordingly, the rule of lenity “comes into operation at the end 
of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning 
as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”42 Moreover, 
despite the rule’s rationale of narrowing the construction of an ambiguous 
criminal provision, it is not “a directive to [courts] to invent distinctions 
neither reflective of the policy behind congressional enactments nor intimated 
by the words used to implement the legislative goal.”43 In this sense, the rule 
of lenity is applied at the end of a court’s interpretive process and does not 
provide a backdrop for the court’s initial inquiry into the meaning of a 
                                                                                                                     
(“[G]enerally, ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant, 
e.g., a less harsh penalty.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2421–23 (2006) 
(describing a more robust rule of lenity that courts were quicker to apply in the face of 
statutory language that could bear multiple reasonable interpretations). 
 39 See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2272 n.10 (2014) (“The 
dissent would apply the rule of lenity here because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a 
narrower construction, but we have repeatedly emphasized that is not the appropriate 
test.”). 
 40 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014) (quoting Barber v. 
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010)); see also Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2209 
(2013) (“Only where ‘the language or history of [the statute] is uncertain’ after looking to 
‘the particular statutory language, . . . the design of the statute as a whole and to its object 
and policy,’ does the rule of lenity serve to give further guidance.” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990))). 
 41 See Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2272 n.10 (“Although the text creates some ambiguity, 
the context, structure, history, and purpose resolve it.”); Barber, 560 U.S. at 488 (“Having 
so considered the statute, we do not believe that there remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty’ in the statutory provision before us. Nor need we now simply ‘guess’ what the 
statute means.”); cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1175–76 (2012) (“Finally, the 
Kawashimas argue that subparagraph [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)](M)’s treatment of tax 
crimes other than tax evasion is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe the 
statute in their favor. It is true that we have, in the past, construed ambiguities in 
deportation statutes in the alien’s favor. We think the application of the present statute clear 
enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted.” (citation omitted)). 
 42 Maracich, 133 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 
(1961)). 
 43 United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 82 (1964). 
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statutory phrase. It is only once the court has exhausted other forms of 
statutory interpretation and is still unable to reach a definitive construction that 
the rule of lenity may be applied. 
C. Lenity As Adjunct to Deference 
The Supreme Court has not squarely resolved the question of whether 
deference is or is not applicable where agency constructions of dual-use 
statutes are presented for review. Indications are, however, that such deference 
is appropriate, as this is in line with a conception of the relationship between 
deference and lenity whereby the deference canons are part of the traditional 
tools of statutory construction and lenity is applicable only in the last resort if 
a “grievous” ambiguity remains. 
The point of contention in Esquivel-Quintana is related to the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Sweet Home, where the Supreme Court offered deference to 
the Secretary of the Interior’s regulatory definition of the statutory term “take” 
in the Endangered Species Act (ESA).44 The majority in Sweet Home opined 
that “[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, 
together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, 
establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable 
interpretation.”45 It rejected the idea of applying the rule of lenity to the case 
simply because the ESA also provides for criminal penalties: “We have never 
suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing 
facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute 
authorizes criminal enforcement.”46 
The rationale of Sweet Home is consistent with the Court’s subsequent 
decisions. In United States v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court applied deference 
to a legislative rule implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and concluded that the Commission’s assessment of the rule, and whether it 
“is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts,”47 must be accorded 
“controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.’”48 Likewise, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., the Supreme Court applied Skidmore deference to the Secretary of 
Labor’s consistent “views about the meaning of . . . enforcement language” 
within the scope of the agency’s expertise.49 Importantly, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696–704 
(1995). 
 45 Id. at 703. 
 46 Id. at 704 n.18. 
 47 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997). 
 48 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). 
 49 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2011); see 
also id. at 15–16 (“These agency views are reasonable. They are consistent with the Act. 
The length of time the agencies have held them suggests that they reflect careful 
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rejected recourse to the rule of lenity only after its application of deference 
principles: “[A]fter engaging in traditional methods of statutory interpretation, 
we cannot find that the statute remains sufficiently ambiguous to warrant 
application of the rule of lenity here.”50 This indicates that the Supreme Court 
views the rule of lenity as a tool of last resort and is leery of using it as a 
means to overturn established agency positions. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has never comprehensively and explicitly 
addressed how deference and lenity interact. Sweet Home, O’Hagan, and 
Kasten all, to an extent, assume the answer for purposes of deciding the case at 
hand.51 Nonetheless, the Court’s extant precedent points in one direction 
only—deference applies where it otherwise applies, and lenity acts only as an 
interpretive tool of absolute last resort, just as it does in the purely criminal 
context. 
There is no case that points in the opposite direction. Judge Sutton seemed 
to cite Leocal v. Ashcroft in support of his application of lenity,52 but that case 
addressed only the interpretation of a purely criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16, 
which the Supreme Court unexceptionally opined must be interpreted the same 
in both criminal and administrative contexts.53 This circumstance is different 
from the purely civil statute at issue in Esquivel-Quintana, and deference 
should apply to the Board’s interpretation of these civil provisions even where 
it does not extend to criminal statutes or provisions of the INA that explicitly 
incorporate criminal statutes.54 Judge Sutton also cited Justice Scalia’s 
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Whitman v. United States, 
joined by Justice Thomas,55 but that opinion offers scant support for the rule 
Judge Sutton would adopt. First, that decision quite explicitly noted the 
unanimity in the courts of appeals contra the position advocated by Justice 
Scalia, thus coloring Judge Sutton’s own view as the clear minority position 
that it is.56 Second, no contrary Supreme Court precedent is cited in Whitman 
for the proposition advanced by Justice Scalia, with reliance being placed 
solely on cases such as Leocal, which are distinguishable given the wholly 
criminal nature of the statute at issue.57 Finally, Justice Scalia’s opinion did no 
more than echo his prior dissent in O’Hagan, where he had earlier alleged a 
                                                                                                                     
consideration, not ‘post hoc rationalization[n].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983))). 
 50 Id. at 16. 
 51 See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.  
 52 Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1031 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 
(2004)), cert. granted, No.16-54, 2016 WL 3689050 (Oct. 28, 2016) (mem.). 
 53 See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8. 
 54 See supra notes 3–5, 25 and accompanying text. 
 55 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1031 (citing Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
352, 354 (2014) (Scalia, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (mem.)). 
 56 See Whitman, 135 S. Ct. at 353 (Scalia, J., statement respecting the denial of 
certiorari) (collecting cases). 
 57 See id. at 353–54. 
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violation of principles of lenity in the application of deference to the SEC’s 
construction of criminal prohibitions.58 The Supreme Court did not adopt his 
views in that case, and their subsequent expression in Whitman, in the context 
of a denial by the full court to grant plenary review to consider the question,59 
provides weak support for the proposition that there is a majority on the 
Supreme Court who believe that lenity should trump deference in the context 
of dual-use statutes. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s leanings on this issue, even if implicit, make 
sense in light of the modern conception of lenity as a last resort, applied only 
after reviewing the text, structure, history, and policy behind the statute. 
Agency expertise fits comfortably within the ambit of these interpretive tools, 
and thus if an agency has permissibly interpreted ambiguity that should be 
considered in the context of determining whether traditional tools of statutory 
construction point to a permissible reading of the statute, while also counseling 
against the need to apply lenity. This also squares with the fact that courts are 
themselves generally engaging in some level of interpretation of criminal laws 
when determining the meaning of a criminal provision, not simply dictating a 
strict construction of the statute. There is little reason to disallow the same 
interpretive authority when it is an agency engaging in this exercise.60  
On a fair assessment of the current state of the law, far from being a 
“view . . . increasing in prominence,”61 the belief that lenity should trump 
deference has been on a largely circular track between the Sixth Circuit and 
the Supreme Court, or, more specifically, between Judge Sutton and his former 
boss, the late Justice Scalia: Justice Scalia cites Judge Sutton for support,62 
while Judge Sutton cites Justice Scalia.63 There is no doubting either of their 
intellects, but there is also no doubt that at present their view has not been 
                                                                                                                     
 58 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 59 See generally Whitman, 135 S. Ct. 352. 
 60 Note, supra note 38, at 2426 (“[J]udicial application of the rule undermines any 
claim that it operates as a nondelegation doctrine. . . . [C]ourts apply the rule of lenity only 
after trying to cure ambiguity by examining the policies behind the law—that is, after 
exercising some delegated legislative power.”); see also id. at 2426 n.45 (citing Caron v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1998)) (explaining that in Caron, the Court rejected 
“a narrow construction that [was] grammatically possible but ‘contrary to a likely, and 
rational, congressional policy’” (quoting Caron, 524 U.S. at 315)). 
 61 Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Nonetheless, 
while this view is increasing in prominence, the Supreme Court has not made it the law. To 
the contrary, the Court has reached the opposite conclusion.”), cert. granted, No.16-54, 
2016 WL 3689050 (Oct. 28, 2016) (mem.). 
 62 See Whitman, 135 S. Ct. at 353 (Scalia, J., statement respecting the denial of 
certiorari) (citing Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 733 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(Sutton, J., concurring)). 
 63 See Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1031 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Whitman, 135 S. Ct. 352 (Scalia, J., statement respecting the 
denial of certiorari)). 
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taken up by the Supreme Court itself, while being contrary to binding 
precedent in every federal court of appeals. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST FORECLOSING DEFERENCE 
Based on the contemporary conception of the rule of lenity and the 
Supreme Court’s consideration of that rule in agency cases, the better legal 
argument is that deference and lenity can coexist, and that this coexistence 
entails lenity applying only as a last resort where traditional tools of statutory 
construction, including deference canons, fail to reasonably resolve ambiguity. 
Practical considerations also militate against displacing deference with a 
default rule of lenity. This Part addresses two such considerations: (1) the 
disproportionate civil immigration caseload as compared to the criminal 
prosecutions potentially affected by agency interpretation; and (2) the ability 
of prosecutorial discretion to mitigate any notice and fairness concerns in the 
criminal proceeding itself. 
A. Disproportionate Curtailment of Board Authority to Interpret the 
INA 
A default rule of lenity would displace agency deference over fairly 
significant portions of the INA. There would be an argument that all 
removability grounds in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) would be undeserving of 
deference, given the criminal penalties assigned to a failure to depart after 
being ordered removed.64 Regardless of the fate of § 1227(a) as a whole, at the 
very least lenity would seemingly attach to interpretations of the alien 
smuggling provision, all criminal grounds, all grounds associated with 
document fraud and misuse, and the security and terrorism related grounds, 
given the heightened sentence imposed if an alien fails to depart after being 
removed under one of these more specific provisions.65 These are significant 
provisions pertaining to matters peculiarly within the expertise of the agency. 
The Board would also be deprived of deference over all security and terrorism 
related inadmissibility grounds, as those sections relate to either an element of 
criminal liability or a basis for a sentence enhancement under Title 8’s 
criminal provisions.66 Finally, no deference would extend to any interpretation 
of the purely civil aggravated felony provision, § 1101(a)(43),67 given the 
inclusion of those grounds as a basis for sentence enhancement under the 
                                                                                                                     
 64 See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2012). 
 65 Id. (referencing aliens ordered removed under § 1227(a)(1)(E), (2), (3), or (4)). 
 66 See id. § 1326(b)(3) (sentence enhancement imposed if alien is excludable under 
terrorism-related provision); id. § 1327 (criminal liability if assisting an alien, who is 
inadmissible under this section, to illegally enter the United States). 
 67 See id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining the term “aggravated felony” as used in Title 8). 
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illegal reentry provision and criminal liability under the smuggling 
provision.68 
But stripping the Board of deference over these civil provisions, when they 
are potentially implicated in tens of thousands of cases each year, is out of 
proportion to any concerns over unfairness or lack of notice to criminal 
defendants if lenity is not applied. In 2013, for instance, immigration judges 
completed a total of 253,942 matters,69 while 350,330 remained pending at the 
close of the year.70 The Board completed a total of 36,690 cases,71 while 
22,940 remained pending.72 
In contrast to these numbers, in 2012 sixteen total convictions were 
entered under § 1253, and eight convictions were entered under § 1327.73 
Moreover, although there are well over ten thousand convictions each year 
under § 1326, these convictions never seem to result in a sentence range 
anywhere near the twenty-year aggravated felony enhancement contemplated 
by § 1326(b)(2), and rarely broach even the ten-year enhancement 
contemplated by the terrorism-related basis of § 1326(b)(3).74 The average 
sentence for illegal reentry in 2013 was eighteen months, under the twenty-
four month statutory maximum under § 1326(a), while the median sentence 
was just one year.75 And as the Commission notes, “Only two of the 18,498 
illegal reentry offenders sentenced in fiscal year 2013 received a sentence 
above ten years,” and this statistic includes the approximately “40.4 percent 
[of offenders] with the most serious criminal histories” that would otherwise 
trigger the twenty-year maximum in § 1326(b)(2).76 
It makes little practical sense to strip the Board of deference to its 
interpretations of the civil statute it is charged with administering in 
potentially tens of thousands of cases each year, simply because 
                                                                                                                     
 68 See id. § 1326(b)(2) (sentence enhancement imposed if alien reenters after having 
been found removable under the aggravated felony provision); id. § 1327 (criminal liability 
if assisting an alien who is inadmissible under the criminal inadmissibility grounds, so long 
as the offense of conviction would constitute an aggravated felony offense). 
 69 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 
STATISTICS YEARBOOK, at A2 fig.1 (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XV8-NSAM]. 
 70 Id. at W1 fig.34. 
 71 Id. at Q1 fig.27. 
 72 Id. at W3 fig.35. 
 73 Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STATS., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/tsec.cfm [https://perma.cc/5WCJ-NMBT] (compiling criminal 
data from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts regarding the outcomes for 
defendants in cases closed in the year 2012). 
 74 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 9 (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-
and-surveys/immigration/2015_Illegal-Reentry-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BHJ-FBVG]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 10. 
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determinations made in some of those cases might have slight (though more 
likely no) relevance to a vanishingly small number of criminal proceedings. 
B. Prosecutorial Discretion in Cases of Potential Ambiguity 
Concerns over any ambiguity, or the Board’s resolution of ambiguous 
terms or phrases, could also be taken into account by prosecutors at the 
charging and sentencing stages of criminal proceedings under the affected 
provisions of Title 8. Given the foregoing criminal prosecution statistics, it 
seems that this already happens to a degree, although the reason is not clear. 
One hint might be in an old, since-repealed provision, which created a 
“judicial deportation” procedure whereby a federal district judge could order 
the removal of a criminal alien following trial if the conviction constituted a 
removable offense.77 In a memorandum from the Attorney General to 
Department of Justice litigators, they were told not to seek judicial deportation 
in cases where doing so would require the district courts to enter into the realm 
of immigration policy: “[I]n view of the Department’s responsibility to 
administer and enforce immigration laws, and considering the ambiguities in 
the judicial deportation statute, prosecutors should not seek judicial 
deportation if the district courts necessarily will become involved in 
contentious immigration issues.”78 This forbearance was especially important 
in areas where contested criminal concepts were at issue, such as the limits of 
what constitutes a “crime involving moral turpitude.”79 
If a potential conviction under Title 8 would turn on a contested 
interpretation of the civil INA, or on interpretation of a provision the Board 
had not yet addressed in a precedential decision, then the better approach is 
that reflected in the Attorney General’s memorandum—do not charge a 
violation of the statute or do not seek a sentence enhancement. In other words, 
confine lenity to the interpretation of the criminal statute by settling on a less-
significant punishment, and thereby avoid displacing deference in the civil 
immigration proceedings. Such a straight-forward approach to the handful of 
cases implicating application of the INA’s relevant criminal provisions is 
surely preferable to a wholesale declination to accord deference where it 
otherwise would be unquestionably warranted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the frequency with which the lenity argument is being raised in 
immigration cases, the Supreme Court will have to confront its merits sooner 
                                                                                                                     
 77 See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-416, tit. II, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305. 
 78 Memorandum from U.S. Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors, Deportation of 
Criminal Aliens (Apr. 28, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-general-april-28-
1995-memorandum-deportation-criminal-aliens [https://perma.cc/GBG5-625C]. 
 79 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970)).  
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rather than later.80 Or perhaps not. It has, in point of fact, largely managed to 
avoid doing so in the three decades since Chevron, despite numerous cases 
where the issue would have been ripe for decision.81 
When—or if—the Court does decide to wade into the issue, it would do 
well to simply make explicit what it has thus far assumed: that when reviewing 
agency interpretations of civil statutes that have potential criminal application, 
Chevron deference applies with full force and the rule of lenity acts only as an 
interpretive aid of last-resort. This holding would be consistent with the rule of 
lenity’s application in the criminal context while safeguarding a basic tenet of 
the administrative state—deference to reasonable agency interpretations of the 
statutes Congress has charged it with administering. 
Judge Sutton’s views are well-reasoned and must be taken into account 
when confronting application of lenity in agency cases. But they should 
ultimately be rejected in favor of the application of deference presented here. 
                                                                                                                     
 80 It may do so in this very case, where certiorari was granted on October 28, 2016. 
See Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, No.16-54, 2016 WL 3689050 (Oct. 28, 2016) (mem.). 
 81 See supra Part III.C. 
